

## A CREDIT PERSPECTIVE: HOW THE NEXT DOWNTURN WILL BE DIFFERENT



See slide 19 for important information regarding our certifications as well as other disclaimers.

# Introduction to Janney Montgomery Scott LLC

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Janney Headquarters

# Goals

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- **November 1<sup>st</sup> PCBE Event Goals:**

- To discuss the post-recession era of corporate bonds
- To identify elements that complicate the story for bondholders
- To address issues that may arise during the next downturn or change in credit cycle



“Can you increase its range?”

# A Quick Recap of Prior PCBE Presentation

- “Exogenous Factors Shaking Outlooks for Firm Fundamentals”

- Presented in March 2015 to PCBE

- Main point was non-Fed factors affecting corporates would be

- Energy/Commodities
- Currencies

## Snapshot from March 2015 Presentation to PCBE


### ...and Seen in Ratings Downgrades of Late

Company Name	Date	Agency	Curr Rtg	Prior Rtg	Company Name	Date	Agency	Curr Rtg	Prior Rtg
Peabody Energy	27-Feb	Moody's	B2	Ba3	Halcon Resources	23-Jan	Moody's	Caa1	B3
Hercules Offshore	26-Feb	S&P	CCC+	B-	DCP Midstream	23-Jan	Moody's	Baa3 *-	Baa2
Comstock Resources	25-Feb	Moody's	B3	B2	American Eagle Energy	22-Jan	Moody's	Ca	Caa1
Rex Energy	25-Feb	S&P	B-	B	NGPL PipeCo	16-Jan	Moody's	Caa2	B3
DCP Midstream Ptnrs	23-Feb	S&P	BB	BBB-	Apache	16-Jan	S&P	A- *-	A-
Quicksilver Resources	19-Feb	S&P	D	CCC-	Black Elk Energy	16-Jan	S&P	CCC-	CCC+
Samson Resources	17-Feb	S&P	CCC+	B- *-	BreitBurn Energy Ptnrs	16-Jan	S&P	B+ *-	B+
Rex Energy	12-Feb	Moody's	B3	B2	Energy XXI	16-Jan	S&P	B	B+
Sabine Oil & Gas	12-Feb	Moody's	Caa2	Caa1	EPL Oil & Gas	16-Jan	S&P	B	B+
Cyprus Amax Minerals	11-Feb	S&P	BBB-	BBB	Magnum Hunter	16-Jan	S&P	CCC+	B-
Freeport-McMoRan	11-Feb	S&P	BBB-	BBB	Midstates Petroleum	16-Jan	S&P	B-	B
AM Castle	9-Feb	S&P	CCC+	B-	Swift Energy	16-Jan	S&P	B-	B
RAAM Global Energy	9-Feb	S&P	CCC-	CCC+	Warren Resources	16-Jan	S&P	B-	B
ArcelorMittal	3-Feb	S&P	BB	BB+	WPX Energy	16-Jan	S&P	BB	BB+
DCP Midstream	2-Feb	Fitch	BBB-	BBB	CITGO Petroleum	15-Jan	Moody's	B3	B1
Arch Coal	2-Feb	Moody's	Caa1	B3	Paragon Offshore	14-Jan	Moody's	Ba3	Ba2
Niska Gas Storage	2-Feb	Moody's	Caa1	B3	Patriot Coal	14-Jan	S&P	B-	B
Niska Gas Storage	2-Feb	S&P	B-	B+	Southwestern Energy	12-Jan	S&P	BBB-	BBB *-
Alpha Natural	30-Jan	Moody's	Caa1	B3	CITGO Petroleum	9-Jan	Fitch	B	BB-
Cliffs Natural Resources	30-Jan	S&P	B	BB-	Wise Metals	8-Jan	Moody's	B3	B3 *+
Energy XXI Gulf Coast	28-Jan	Moody's	Caa1	B2	Resolute Energy	8-Jan	Moody's	Caa2	Caa1
EPL Oil & Gas	28-Jan	Moody's	Caa2	B3	Halcon Resources	23-Jan	Moody's	Caa1	B3
Alliance Pipeline	27-Jan	Moody's	Baa2	Baa1 *-	DCP Midstream	23-Jan	Moody's	Baa3 *-	Baa2
Midstates Petroleum	26-Jan	Moody's	Caa1	B3	American Eagle Energy	22-Jan	Moody's	Ca	Caa1

Source: Janney FISR; Moody's; S&P; Fitch; Bloomberg; only showing US companies that were downgraded since the start of 2015

# Lessons Learned from the Selloff in Energy

- **Selloff in energy can show how quickly the market can move either direction**
  - Energy prices not yet back to pre-selloff levels, but high yield credit spreads are
- **Individual and institutional investors had difficulty exiting positions**
- **Companies employed creative financing to extend liquidity situations**
- **Energy represented 16% of HY index in June 2014 and 14% today**



# A Look Back At How We Got Here – The Post-Recession Era Story

## ■ Low rates getting lower meant:


- Low cost of debt capital
- Potential for firms to
  - Refinance debt to push out maturities
  - Build up liquidity
  - Focus on balance sheet

## ■ Shareholders were patient in the few years post-recession

- Now activist investors are demanding returns via dividends, share buybacks, spin-offs, etc.
- Capex still not to pre-recession levels


## ■ Side note: Remember the “maturity wall” of 2014?

**Leverage Has Risen from the 2014 Lows, But Not At Pre-Recession Highs**



# The Post-Recession Era Story (cont.)


- **Cash balances at a peak, but earnings generated overseas (therefore cash held overseas) elevated vs pre-recession**
- **Fit with narrative of stronger companies → buy corporate bonds**
- **Concentration of cash among top issuers implies total does not tell whole story**
- **Companies' capex plans have not returned to pre-recession levels relative to cash on hand**
  - Speaks to lack of long-term growth plans
- **Optimism shifted positive post-election**
- **Tug-and-pull equity vs debt markets**





# The Present: Issuance Volume

US Corporate Issuance Has Been Robust in Years Post-Recession as Rates Remained Low



# Investors Are Feeding Off Robust Returns


- Returns in corporates vs other fixed income asset classes have perpetuated investors' interest

- Credit spreads are narrow and getting narrower

- IG at 10+ year tight
- HY near June 2014 tights


Name	YTD Rtn	1Yr Rtn	3Yr Rtn	5Yr Rtn	7Yr Rtn
US Aggregate	2.91%	0.68%	6.74%	10.56%	22.37%
US Treasury	1.83%	(0.86%)	4.36%	6.42%	16.40%
US Agg Gov't-Related	3.64%	1.29%	6.37%	10.08%	20.50%
Municipal Bond	4.87%	2.29%	9.11%	15.89%	31.19%
<b>US Corp Ivmt Grade</b>	<b>5.27%</b>	<b>3.14%</b>	<b>11.26%</b>	<b>17.61%</b>	<b>37.82%</b>
<b>US Corp High Yield</b>	<b>7.40%</b>	<b>8.36%</b>	<b>17.71%</b>	<b>35.36%</b>	<b>62.17%</b>
US MBS	2.03%	0.33%	5.98%	10.17%	19.33%
Euro Aggregate	0.77%	(0.04%)	7.49%	22.00%	33.88%
Asian Pacific Agg	0.72%	0.16%	5.57%	14.70%	20.22%
Global Infl-Linked	4.39%	2.35%	2.07%	6.01%	21.42%

## IG Credit Spreads Are at July 2007 Tights, but High Yield Still Slightly Wide of June 2014 Tights



# Flows Into Taxable Fixed Income Funds Largely Positive


## Investors Continue to Buy Bonds



# Fund Ownership of Corporate Bonds Reduces Market Depth

- Fund representation of corporate and foreign bonds ticked up, particularly in the post-recession era
- Contrasts with insurance companies that have pared back their ownership post-recession and pensions that have moderated corporate positions since 2000
- Asset/liability mismatch during volatile market situations?
- December 2015: Third Ave Focused Credit Fund biggest mutual fund failure since recession


**Fund Ownership of Corporates Rose, While Insurance & Pensions Shrank**



# Cov-lite, High Yield-lite, and Lack of Bondholder Protection


- **Moody's noted recently the expansion of cov-lite bonds**
  - Bond Covenant Quality Indicator “near record worst of Aug 2015”
  - Loan Covenant Quality Indicator worst 4Q 2016
  
- **Per S&P LCD, cov-lite as % of US leveraged loan market ticked up to 73% in Sep 2017 (record high) from 58% in Sep 2014**
  - Total loans outstanding of \$947B
  
- **CLO market active with buy-side participating**

Moody's Bond and Loan Covenant Quality Indicators Peaked Recently




# More High Yield Credits, More 144A Issuance

## More Credits Are at the Lower End of the Ratings Spectrum



## High Yield 144A Issuance Is on the Rise, Meaning Fewer Alternatives for Individuals



Source: Janney ISG, Moody's, S&P, Bloomberg, Company Reports; 2017 a/o 10/27/2017

# A Lack of Market Liquidity?

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
- **Regulatory changes affecting liquidity**
  - Smaller dealer inventories with size restrictions for some asset classes
  - Volcker Rule, Basel III, SLR
  
- **Larger buy-side, consolidation of sell-side participants**
  
- **Electronic trading platforms**
  
- **Hard to identify market liquidity other than by**
  - Ease and speed of transaction
  - Cost of transaction – bid-ask spread
  - Depth of market – dealer inventories, market turnover
  - Buoyancy – how quickly recover from bouts of volatility
  
- **Examples of bouts of volatility:**
  - June/July 2013 “rate shock”
  - Fall 2014-Feb 2016 energy selloff

# Trading Volumes Are Misleading

- **Both investment grade and high yield volumes have been elevated in past few years**

- Speaks to actively traded market and coincides with busy primary market
- Does not show full story – large block trades not fully represented


- **Bouts of volatility prove how sensitive market is – lack of depth**





# A “Fun” Comparison: Energy vs Retail

- Recent softening of the retail space is reminiscent of Fall 2014-Feb 2016 with energy
- Fewer corporate bonds in retail vs energy circa 2014
- Contagion effect coupled with headline risk
- Retail now cited by Moody’s and S&P as main risk of default rates increasing
- More meaningful if combined with challenges from autos (auto lending), student loans, and/or credit card loans, or if other sector (Telecom & Media?)



Sector	% of Bloomberg/Barclays US HY	As of 10/27/2017	As of 06/30/2014
Communications		20%	18%
Consumer, Non-cyclical		16%	15%
Consumer, Cyclical		15%	15%
Energy		14%	16%
Financial		10%	11%
Industrial		10%	11%
Basic Materials		7%	6%
Technology		6%	4%
Utilities		3%	3%
Diversified		0%	0%

# Summary

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- **The “buy everything corporates” narrative has run its course – data around credit quality has an upward bias**
- **The low-rate environment has supported more favorable conditions for companies over bondholders**
- **Factors that will make this next downturn different**
  - The expansion of cov-lite and reduced bondholder protection
  - A larger corporate bond market
  - More fund participation in corporates
  - Lack of market liquidity in volatile environments

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**Overweight:** Janney ISG expects the target asset class or sector to outperform the comparable benchmark (below) in its asset class in terms of total return

**Marketweight:** Janney ISG expects the target asset class or sector to perform in line with the comparable benchmark (below) in its asset class in terms of total return

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**Asset Classes:** Janney ISG ratings for domestic fixed income asset classes including Treasuries, Agencies, Mortgages, Investment Grade Credit, High Yield Credit, and Municipals employ the "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Market Index" as a benchmark.

**Treasuries:** Janney ISG ratings employ the "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. Treasury Index" as a benchmark.

**Agencies:** Janney ISG ratings employ the "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. Agency Index" as a benchmark.

**Mortgages:** Janney ISG ratings employ the "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. MBS Index" as a benchmark.

**Investment Grade Credit:** Janney ISG ratings employ the "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. Credit Index" as a benchmark.

**High Yield Credit:** Janney ISG ratings employ "Bloomberg/Barclays U.S. Corporate High Yield Index" as a benchmark.

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